Abstract-A new single packet authentication method HSPA is presented in this paper. HSPA works transparently for authenticating remote clients and in its design solved two main problems, resource starvation attack and the lack of association between the authentication process and establishing process. Authentication data of HSPA packet is maintained secure by encrypting it using Rijndael, in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode, with a block size of 192 bits and a key length of 192 bits. HSPA evaluation study, in accordance to processing overhead, buffering, and communication overhead, shows that HSPA overhead is marginal as compared to its improvements in authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many machines now run some form of Firewall to help prevent unauthorized connections to open ports, however, if the machine is needed to run services accessible to the Internet, then this is not always an option. There are countless ways to protect information flowing over a network, but if the software running those services has bugs, then protecting that machine against attacks becomes a much bigger problem [1] . Most software has vulnerabilities and now system administrators cannot rely on the security provided by software manufacturers. Thousands of bugs that could be exploited by malicious attackers have been found in all kinds of network services. Those bugs are often fixed weeks, months or even years after they were made public so the window of exposure for some vulnerabilities can be very high. Critical systems need additional layers of security to prevent zero-day exploit attacks against running services and this is when Passive Authentication Techniques come in handy [2] .
Passive Authentication Techniques are Port knocking PK and Single Packet Authentication SPA. They are methods to keep a machine hidden from would-be attackers, and yet allow legitimate users to connect to services running on that machine. In broad terms, they are methods for transmitting information across closed ports, with the aim of authenticating users before allowing them, and only them, to access a protected service [1] .
These can be achieved in many ways but in general a client sends a specific sequence of connection attempts to a listening server. The server detects this sequence and opens one of its ports so the client machine can connect to it. This prevents attackers from scanning your network for open ports or attacking network services with 0-day exploits because the protected ports will appear to be closed [2] .
Although that port knocking provides some real benefits that enhance security, still has some serious limitations [3] , [4] . Single Packet Authentication [5] , [4] is a relatively newer protocol that retains all of the benefits of port knocking, but fixes many PK limitations [5] .
II. SPA MECHANISM
In general a client prepares the authentication data that is put in the payload of a single UDP/TCP packet (SPA packet) then sends the packet to the listening server. The server detects, validates SPA packet and opens one of its ports, which is required. So the client machine can connect to it. For a graphical representation of SPA in action, see Fig. 1 . Although that SPA fixes many PK limitations, it stills suffer from many problems. One problem is the lack of association between the authentication process and the follow-on TCP connection to be established. This problem enables the attacker to connect to a protected service on behalf of a valid client, after the client has successfully authenticated with the firewall but before he establishes a TCP connection with this service. Another problem is Resource Starvation Attacks against the server daemon through replaying SPA packet, which make the server daemon consuming resources, and make the authentication service unavailable.
A new proposal HSPA for authentication purposes, which tackles these problems, is presented in this paper.
III. PROPOSED DESIGN
As any SPA implementation, HSPA relies on a packet sniffer and a completely closed firewall ) entire TCP ports are Harden Single Packet Authentication (HSPA) Haythem Zorkta and Basel Almutlaq, Member, IACSIT closed (, which is set to drop all packets that arrive over TCP. That makes firewall to be more silent in its denial (packets that arrive are dropped without sending an ICMP PORT UNREACHABLE back to the initiator) [6] , [7] . Two separate software components are required in HSPA, one at client side and the other at the server. Packet filters will be reconfigured after SPA packet is received and validated by server daemon.
HSPA defines his packet format as: (see Fig. 2  Timestamp (4bytes) and random number (2 bytes) are used to solve Replay Attack Problem. Server daemon compares these 6 bytes with corresponding 6 bytes of last SPA packet received from this client. If it is equal or smaller, then it assumes that there is a replay attack, and takes no action and writes a warning message to WarnLog. Hence, any SPA packet that is intercepted by a third party cannot be replayed on the network in an effort to get access through the default-drop packet filter.  TCP/UDP bit, which is the lest important bit of random number, defines the transport protocol (TCP or UDP) of next SPA packet, (1 for TCP, 0 for UDP).  User name (10 bytes) is used to maintain different authorization levels for remote users by the server daemon.  Client IP address (4 bytes) is the IP address of the client.  Desired port address (2 bytes) is the port address that which the client wants to access to it.  Next time port address (2 bytes) represents a port address, which next SPA packet will send over it. It used to solve the DoS attacks to server daemon. Since the destination port address of SPA packet, is different from previous SPA packet, if a third party intercepts any SPA packet, and replays it, there is no listening to this port address by server daemon. Entire detected SYN/fin/RST TCP packet: is the SYN/FIN/RST TCP packet that the client sends it to server for initiate/finalize/reset TCP session. The client daemon detects this packet and used it entirely in HSPA packet.
Checksum: is the CRC32 digest of both authentication data and entire detected SYN/fin/RST TCP packet. It is used by server to verify SPA packet integrity, see The following sequence gives overview of how HSPA works: 1) 1-Server daemon listens to a number of specific TCP/UDP ports for incoming SPA packet from specific clients, where it specify a TCP or UDP port for each client (see Fig. 5 ). 2) 2-A client send SYN/FIN/RST TCP packet to the server to initeiate/finalize/reset TCP session. This packet will be droped when it has been arrived, by server packet filter, because all TCP ports are closed (see Fig. 6 ).
3) 3-Client daemon detects SYN/FIN/RST TCP packet
transmitted by the client, generates a SPA pcaket and sends it to the server over an agreed TCP or UDP port address. This packet is used to authenticate the client for the server, and it contains the transmitted SYN/FIN/RST TCP packet (see Fig. 7 ). 4) 4-Server daemon receives the SPA packet, decrypts encrypted authentication data, validates user name, checksum, timestamp and random number, passes the entire detected SYN/fin/RST TCP packet into stack and drop it. Server daemon reconfigures the Firewall, allowing client to access the desired port. Finally, server daemon starts listening to the new next time port address for next SPA packet from this client. The first step of TCP three way hand shacking, has been completed now (see Fig. 8 ). The other two steps will run normally without any intervention by the client and server daemons. Presenting droping pcket by packet filter.
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IV. HSPA EVALUATION
The most critical parameter for SPA analytical study is the performance factor. Thus, three basic analysis parameters were used to evaluate the HSPA performance: processing overhead, communication overhead and buffering. Moreover strength analysis attempt is presented also.
A. Processing Overhead
Processing overhead is the time amount which added to the main time work of the machines in both sides of the authentication system. While HSPA provide improvements for authentication, it burdens the processor. HSPA Processing Overhead was measured through one second for client and server sides, using Intel Pentium 4 machine running at 3.2 GHz with 4 MHz bus, 2 MB L2 Cache and 3 GB of RAM. Table I list these results (see also Fig. 9 and Fig.  10 ).
HSPA processing overhead is increased proportionally with the number of HSPA packets sent in time unit. There is 144µsec and 181µsec are added to the actual time at client and server sides respectively. HSPA processing overhead is marginal as compared to the improvements in authentication.
B. Communication Overhead (bytes)
Communication overhead is the data amount in bytes, which added to the main transmission traffic volume. HSPA packet format suggests that, the sizes of its fields are (see Fig.   2 Total  overhead  for  session   1  TCP  TCP  40  122  122  244  2  TCP  UDP 40  122  110  232  3  UDP TCP  40  110  122  232  4  UDP UDP 40  110  110  220  5  TCP  TCP  64  146  146  292  6  TCP  UDP 64  146  134  280  7  UDP TCP  64  134  146  280  8  UDP UDP 64  134  134  268  9  TCP  TCP  120  202  202  404  10 TCP  UDP 120  202  190  392 Results in previous scenario, shows that HSPA communications overhead is marginal as compared to the improvements in authentication.
C. Buffering
Since, both of client and server daemons buffering the entire HSPA packet, two suitable buffers are needed at both sides for caching it (see Table III ).
With the Worst Case of the last scenario, only 14.3Kbytes is needed at each side, and these buffering requirements are marginal as compared to the HSPA improvements in authentication.
D. Strength Evaluation
In General, SPA can be used to construct authentication systems on firewalls with the goal of only allowing authorized users access to open ports. Although that SPA provides some real benefits that enhance security, it still has some serious limitations. HSPA fixes two of these limitations: Resources Starvation attacks and the lack of association between the authentication process and establishing process. By appending SYN, FIN, and RST TCP PACKET to SPA packet, HSPA solves the lack of association between authentication process and the follow-on TCP connection to be established, where the attacker can connect to a protected service on behalf of a valid client, after client has successfully authenticated with the firewall, but before he establishes a TCP connection with this service.
Moreover, with HSPA, the server listen to a new TCP or UDP port for each SPA packet. Therefore, Resource Starvation Attacks against the server daemon through replaying SPA packet, that makes the server daemon consuming resources, and makes the authentication service unavailable, was solved.
Authentication data of HSPA packet is maintained secure by encrypting it using already exist standard encryption algorithm (Rijndael, in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, with a block size of 192-bits and a key length of 192-bits).
V. COMPARATIVE STUDY
A comparative study between HSPA and other advanced SPA techniques (aldaba, Fwknop), shows that HSPA not only provides characteristics of other techniques like authorization and encryption (see Table IV ), but it also provides solutions for these problems:  A lack of association between authentication and TCP connections being established.
 Resurce Starvation Attacks. This means that HSPA is robust against attacks more than existing SPA techniques.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A new SPA proposal (HSPA) for authentication purposes is presented in this paper. HSPA provides solutions for:
 A lack of association between authentication and TCP connections being established.  Resurce Starvation Attacks. Analysis study proved that HSPA is robust against attacks more than existing SPA techniques, and has marginal processing, communications, and buffering overhead, when compared to the improvements in authentication. 
